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Abstract
Businesses (retailers) often wish to offer personalized advertisements (coupons) to individuals (consumers), but
run the risk of strong reactions from consumers who want a customized shopping experience but feel their privacy
has been violated. Existing models for privacy such as differential privacy or information theory try to quantify
privacy risk but do not capture the subjective experience and heterogeneous expression of privacy-sensitivity. We
propose a Markov decision process (MDP) model to capture (i) different consumer privacy sensitivities via a time-
varying state; (ii) different coupon types (action set) for the retailer; and (iii) the action-and-state-dependent cost for
perceived privacy violations. For the simple case with two states (“Normal” and “Alerted”), two coupons (targeted
and untargeted) model, and consumer behavior statistics known to the retailer, we show that a stationary threshold-
based policy is the optimal coupon-offering strategy for a retailer that wishes to minimize its expected discounted
cost. The threshold is a function of all model parameters; the retailer offers a targeted coupon if their belief that the
consumer is in the ”Alerted” state is below the threshold. We extend this two-state model to consumers with multiple
privacy-sensitivity states as well as coupon-dependent state transition probabilities. Furthermore, we study the case
with imperfect (noisy) cost feedback from consumers and uncertain initial belief state.
Keywords-Privacy, Markov decision processes, retailer-consumer interaction, optimal policies.
I. INTRODUCTION
Programs such as retailer “loyalty cards” allow companies to automatically track a customer’s financial transac-
tions, purchasing behavior, and preferences. They can then use this information to offer customized incentives, such
as discounts on related goods. Consumers may benefit from retailer’s knowledge by using more of these targeted
discounts or coupons while shopping. However, in some cases the coupon offer implies that the retailer has learned
something sensitive or private about the consumer. For example, a retailer could infer a consumer’s pregnancy [1].
Such violations may make consumers skittish about purchasing from such retailers.
However, modeling the privacy-sensitivity of a consumer is not always straightforward: widely-studied models
for quantifying privacy risk using differential privacy or information theory do not capture the subjective experience
and heterogeneous expression of consumer privacy. The goal of this paper is to introduce a framework to model the
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consumer-retailer interaction problem and better understand how retailers can develop coupon-offering policies that
balances their revenue objectives while being sensitive to consumer privacy concerns. The main challenge for the
retailer is that the consumer’s responses to coupons are not known a priori; furthermore, consumers do not “add
noise” to their purchasing behavior as a mechanism to stay private. Rather, the offer of a coupon may provoke a
reaction from the consumer, ranging from “unaffected” to “ambiguous” or “partially concerned” to “creeped out.”
This reaction is mediated by the consumer’s sensitivity level to privacy violations, and it is these levels that we
seek to model via a Markov decision process. These privacy-sensitivity states of the consumers are often revealed
to the retailer through their purchasing patterns. In the simplest case, they may accept or reject a targeted coupon.
We capture these aspects in our model and summarize our main contributions below.
A. Main Contributions
We propose a partially-observed Markov decision process (POMDP) model for this problem in which the
consumer’s state encodes their privacy sensitivity, and the retailer can offer different levels of privacy-violating
coupons. The simplest instance of our model is one with two states for the consumer, denoted as “Normal” and
“Alerted,” and two types of coupons: untargeted low privacy (LP) or targeted high privacy (HP). At each time, the
retailer may offer a coupon and the consumer transitions from one state to another according to a Markov chain that
is independent of the offered coupon. The retailer suffers a cost that depends both on the type of coupon offered
and the state of the consumer. The costs reflect the advantage of offering targeted HP coupons relative to untargeted
LP ones while simultaneously capturing the risk of doing so when the consumer is already “Alerted”.
Under the assumption that the retailer (via surveys or prior knowledge) knows the statistics of the consumer
Markov process, i.e., the likelihoods of becoming “Alerted” and staying “Alerted”, and a belief about the initial
consumer state, we study the problem of determining the optimal coupon-offering policy that the retailer should
adopt to minimize the long-term discounted costs of offering coupons. We extend the simple model above to multiple
states and coupon-dependent transitions. We model the latter via two Markov processes for the consumer, one for
each type (HP or LP) of coupon such that a persnickety consumer who is easily “Alerted” will be more likely to
do so when offered an HP (relative to LP) coupon. Furthermore, for noisy costs, we propose a heuristic method
to compute the decision policy. Moreover, if the initial belief state is unknown to the retailer, we use a Bayesian
model to estimate the belief state. Our main results can be summarized as follows:
1) There exists an optimal, stationary, threshold-based policy for offering coupons such that a HP coupon is
offered only if the belief of being in the “Alerted” state at each interaction time is below a certain threshold;
this threshold is a function of all the model parameters. This structural result holds for multiple states and
coupon-dependent transitions.
2) The threshold for offering a targeted HP coupon increases in the following cases:
a) once “Alerted,” the consumer remains so for a while – the retailer is more willing to take risks since
the the consumer takes a while to transition to “Normal”;
b) the consumer is very unlikely to get “Alerted”;
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c) the cost of offering an untargeted LP coupon is high and close to the cost of offering a targeted HP
coupon to an “Alerted” consumer; and
d) when the retailer does not discount the future heavily, i.e., the retailer stands to benefit by offering HP
coupons for a larger set of beliefs about the consumer’s state.
3) For the coupon-dependent Markov model for the consumer, the threshold is smaller than for the non-coupon
dependent case which encapsulates the fact that highly sensitive consumers will force the retailers to behave
more conservatively.
4) By adopting a heuristic threshold policy computed by the mean value of costs, the retailer can minimize
the discounted cost effectively even if costs are noisy. Moreover, the Bayesian approach helps the retailer to
estimate the consumer state when the initial belief state is unknown.
Our results use many fundamental tools and techniques from the theory of MDPs through appropriate and meaningful
problem modeling. We briefly review the related literature in consumer privacy studies as well as MDPs.
B. Related Work
Several economic studies have examined consumer’s attitudes towards privacy via surveys and data analysis
including studies on the benefits and costs of using private data (e.g., Aquisti and Grossklags in [2]). On the other
hand, formal methods such as differential privacy are finding use in modeling the value of private data for market
design [3] and for the problem of partitioning goods with private valuation function amongst the agents [4]. In
these models the goal is to elicit private information from individuals. Venkitasubramaniam [5] recently used an
MDP model to study data sharing in control systems with time-varying state. He minimizes the weighted sum of
the utility (benefit) that the system achieves by sharing data (e.g., with a data collector) and the resulting privacy
leakage, quantified using the information-theoretic equivocation function. In our work we do not quantify privacy
loss directly; instead we model privacy-sensitivity and resulting user behavior via MDPs to determine interaction
policies that can benefit both consumers and retailers. To the best of our knowledge, a formal model for consumer-
retailer interactions and the related privacy issues has not been studied before; in particular, our work focuses on
explicitly considering the consequence to the retailer of the consumers’ awareness of privacy violations.
Markov decision processes (MDPs) have been widely used for decades across many fields [6], [7]; in particular,
our model is related to problems in control with communication constraints [8], [9] where state estimation has a cost.
Our costs are action and state dependent and we consider a different optimization problem. Classical target-search
problems [10] also have optimal policies that are thresholds, but in our model the retailer goal is not to estimate
the consumer state but to minimize cost. The model we use is most similar to Ross’s model of product quality
control with deterioration [11], which was more recently used by Laourine and Tong to study the Gilbert-Elliot
channel in wireless communications [12], in which the channel has two states and the transmitter has two actions
(transmit or not). We cannot apply their results directly due to our different cost structure, but use ideas from their
proofs. Furthermore, we go beyond these works to study privacy-utility tradeoffs in consumer-retailer interactions
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with more than two states and action-dependent transition probabilities. We apply more general MDP analysis tools
to address our formal behavioral model for privacy-sensitive consumers.
While the MDP model used in this paper is simple, its application to the problem of revenue maximization with
privacy-sensitive consumers is novel. We show that the optimal stationary policy exists and it is a threshold on the
probability of the consumer being alerted. We extend the model to cases of consumers with multiple states and
consumers with coupon-dependent transition probabilities. Our basic model assumes the probability of the consumer
being alerted can be inferred from the received costs. When the costs are stochastic, we use a Bayesian estimator to
track this probability and propose a heuristic coupon offering policy for this setting. In the conclusion we describe
several other interesting avenues for future work.
The paper is organized as follows: Section II introduces the system model and its extensions. The main result for
known consumer statistics are presented in Section III. Section IV and V discuss optimal stationary policy results
for consumers with coupon dependent response and noisy costs with unknown initial belief, respectively. Finally,
some concluding remarks and future work are provided in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We model interactions between a retailer and a consumer via a discrete-time system (Figure 1). At each time t,
the consumer has a discrete-valued state and the retailer may offer one of two coupons: high privacy risk (HP) or
low privacy risk (LP). The consumer responds to the personalized coupon by imposing a cost on the retailer that
depends on the coupon offered and its own state. For example, a consumer who is “alerted” (privacy-aware) may
respond to an HP coupon by imposing a high cost to the retialer, such as reducing purchases at the retailer. The
retailer’s goal is to decide which type of coupon to offer at each time t to minimize its cost.
A. Consumer with Two States and Coupon Independent Transitions.
1) Consumer Model:
Modelling Assumption 1: (Consumer’s state) We model the consumer’s response to coupons by assuming them
to be in one of several states. Each state corresponds to a type of consumer behavior in terms of purchasing
(Privacy sensitivity).
For this paper, we first focus on the two-state case; the consumer may be Normal or Alerted. Later we will extend
this model to multiple consumer states, consumer with coupon dependent response, and unknown initial consumer
state cases. The consumer state at timet t is denoted by Gt ∈ {Normal,Alerted}. If a consumer is in Normal state,
the consumer is less sensitive to coupons from the retailer in terms of privacy. However, in the Alerted state, the
consumer is likely to be more sensitive to coupons offered by the retailer, since it is more cautious about revealing
information to the retailer. The evolution of the consumer state is modeled as a infinite-horizon discrete time Markov
chain (Figure 1). The consumer starts out in a random initial state unknown to the retailer and the transition of the
consumer state is independent of the action of the retailer. A belief state is a probability distribution over possible
states in which the consumer could be. The belief of the consumer being in Alerted state at time t is denoted by
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pt. We define λN,A = Pr[Gt = Alerted|Gt−1 = Normal] to be the transition probability from Normal state to
Alerted state and λA,A = Pr[Gt = Alerted|Gt−1 = Alerted] to be the probability of staying in Alerted state when
the previous state is also Alerted. The transition matrix Λ of the Markov chain can be written as
Λ =
1− λN,A λN,A
1− λA,A λA,A
 . (1)
We assume the transition probabilities are known to the retailer; this may come from statistical analysis such as a
survey of consumer attitudes. The one step transition function, defined by
T (pt) = (1− pt)λN,A + ptλA,A, (2)
represents the belief that the consumer is in Alerted state at time t+ 1 given pt, the Alerted state belief at time t.
Modelling Assumption 2: (State transitions) Consumers have an inertia in that they tend to stay in the same
state. Moreover, once consumers feel their privacy is violated, it will take some time for them to come back to
Normal state.
The above assumption implies λA,A ≥ 1− λA,A, 1− λN,A ≥ λN,A, and λN,A ≥ 1− λA,A. Thus, by combining
the above three inequalities, we have λA,A ≥ λN,A.
2) Retailer Model: At each time t, the retailer can take an action by offering a coupon to the consumer. We
define the action at time t to be ut ∈ {HP, LP}, where HP denotes offering a high privacy risk coupon (e.g. a
targeted coupon) and LP denotes offering a low privacy risk coupon (e.g. a generic coupon). The retailer’s utility is
modeled by a cost (negative revenue) which depends on the consumer’s state and the type of coupon being offered.
If the retailer offers an LP coupon, it suffers a cost CL independent of the consumer’s state: offering LP coupons
does not reveal anything about the state. However, if the retailer offers an HP coupon, then the cost is CHN or
CHA depending on whether the consumer’s state is Normal or Alerted. Offering an HP (high privacy risk, targeted)
coupon to a Normal consumer should incur a low cost (high reward), but offering an HP coupon to an Alerted
consumer should incur a high cost (low reward) since an Alerted consumer is privacy-sensitive. Thus, we assume
CHN ≤ CL ≤ CHA.
Under these conditions, the retailer’s objective is to choose ut at each time t to minimize the total cost inccured
over the entire time horizon. The HP coupon reveals information about the state through the cost, but is risky if
the consumer is alerted, creating a tension between cost minimization and acquiring state information.
3) Minimum Cost Function: We define C(pt, ut) to be the expected cost acquired from an individual consumer
at time t where pt is the probability that the consumer is in Alerted state and ut is the retailer’s action:
C(pt, ut) =
 CL if ut = LP(1− pt)CHN + ptCHA if ut = HP . (3)
Since the retailer knows the consumer state from the incurred cost only when an HP coupon is offered, the state of
the consumer may not be directly observable to the retailer. Therefore, the problem is actually a Partially Observable
5
R
et
ai
le
r
N A
LP
HP
CL CL
1 − λNA 1 − λAA λAA
λNA
CHACHN
Figure 1: Markov state transition model for a two-state consumer.
Markov Decision Process (POMDP) [13].
We model the cost of violating a consumer’s privacy as a short term effect. Thus, we adopt a discounted cost
model with discount factor β ∈ (0, 1). At each time t, the retailer has to choose which action ut to take in order
to minimize the expected discounted cost over infinite horizon. A policy pi for the retailer is a rule that selects a
coupon to offer at each time. Thus, given that the belief of the consumer being in Alerted state at time t is pt and
the policy is pi, the infinite-horizon discounted cost starting from t is
V pi,tβ (pt) = Epi
[ ∞∑
i=t
βiC(pi, ui)|pt
]
, (4)
where Epi indicates the expectation over the policy pi. The objective of the retailer is equivalent to minimizing the
discounted cost over all possible policies. Thus, we define the minimum cost function starting from time t over all
policies to be
V tβ (pt) = min
pi
V pi,tβ (pt) for all pt ∈ [0, 1]. (5)
We define pt+1 to be the belief of the consumer being in Alerted state at time t+ 1. The minimum cost function
V tβ (pt) satisfies the Bellman equation [13]:
V tβ (pt) = min
ut∈{HP,LP}
{V tβ,ut(pt)}, (6)
V tβ,ut(pt) = β
tC(pt, ut) + V
t+1
β (pt+1|pt, ut). (7)
An optimal policy is stationary if it is a deterministic function of states, i.e., the optimal action at a particular
state is the optimal action in this state at all times. We define P = {[0, 1]} to be the belief space and U = {LP,HP}
to be the action space. In the context of our model, the optimal stationary policy is a deterministic function mapping
P into U . Since the problem is an infinite-horizon, finite state and finite action MDP with discounted cost, by [14],
there exists an optimal stationary policy pi∗ such that starting from time t,
V tβ (pt) = V
pi∗,t
β (pt). (8)
Thus, only the optimal stationary policy is considered because it is tractable and achieves the same minimum cost
as any optimal non-stationary policy.
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By (6) and (7), the minimum cost function evolves as follows. If an HP coupon is offered at time t, the retailer
can perfectly infer the consumer state based on the incurred cost. Therefore,
V tβ,HP(pt) = β
tC(pt,HP) + (1− pt)V t+1β (λN,A) + ptV t+1β (λA,A). (9)
If an LP coupon is offered at time t, the retailer cannot infer the consumer state from the cost since both Normal
and Alerted consumer impose the same cost CL. Hence, the discounted cost function can be written as
V tβ,LP(pt) = β
tC(pt, LP) + V
t+1
β (pt+1)
= βtCL + V
t+1
β (T (pt)). (10)
Correspondingly, the minimum cost function is given by
V tβ (pt) = min{V tβ,LP(pt), V tβ,HP(pt)}. (11)
We now describe some simple extensions of this basic model.
B. Consumer with Multi-Level Alerted States
In this section, the case that the consumer has multiple Alerted states is studied. Without loss of generality, we
define Gt ∈ {Normal,Alerted1, . . .AlertedK} to be the consumer state at time t. If the consumers is in Alertedk
state, it is even more cautious about coupons than in Alertedk−1 state. Beliefs of the consumer being in Normal,
Alerted1, . . . ,AlertedK state at time t are defined by p¯t = (pN,t, pA1,t, . . . , pAK ,t)
T . At each time t, the retailer
can offer either an HP or an LP coupon. Costs of the retailer when an HP coupon is offered while the state of the
consumer is Normal, Alerted1, . . . ,AlertedK are defined by C¯ = (CHN , CHA1 , . . . , CHAK )
T . If an LP coupon is
offered, no matter in which state, the retailer gets a cost of CL. We assume that CHAK ≥ · · · ≥ CHA1 ≥ CL ≥ CHN .
The minimum cost function evolves as follows:
V tβ (p¯t) = min{V tβ,LP(p¯t), V tβ,HP(p¯t)}, (12)
where V tβ,LP(p¯t) = β
tCL +V
t+1
β (p¯t+1) and V
t
β,HP(p¯t) = β
tp¯Tt C¯ +V
t+1
β (p¯t+1) represents the cost of offering an
LP and an HP coupon, respectively. This model can be generalized to consumer with finitely many states.
C. Consumer with Coupon Dependent Transitions
In the previous formulations, we assume that the consumer’s state transition is independent of the retailer’s
action. A natural extension is the case where the action of the retailer can affect the dynamics of the consumer
state evolution (Figure 2). Generally, a consumer’s reactions to HP and LP coupons are different. For example,
a consumer is likely to feel less comfortable when being offered a coupon on medication (HP) than food (LP).
Thus, in Section IV, we assume that the Markov transition probabilities are dependent on the coupon offered with
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Figure 2: Coupon type dependent Markov state transition model.
transition matrix given by ΛLP(ΛHP), where ΛLP and ΛHP are defined as:
ΛLP =
1− λN,A λN,A
1− λA,A λA,A
 ,ΛHP =
1− λ′N,A λ′N,A
1− λ′A,A λ′A,A
 . (13)
Thus, the minimum cost function is given by (11), where V tβ,LP(pt) = β
tC(pt, LP)+V
t+1
β (T (pt)) and V
t
β,HP(pt) =
βtC(pt,HP) + (1− pt)V t+1β (λ′N,A) + ptV t+1β (λ′A,A) denotes the cost function of using an LP coupon and an HP
coupon, respectively. T (pt) and T ′(pt) are the one step transition given by T (pt) = λN,A(1 − pt) + λA,Apt and
T ′(pt) = λ′N,A(1− pt) + λ′A,Apt.
D. Policies under Noisy Cost Feedback and Uncertain Initial Belief
Consider a setting in which the feedback regarding the cost may be noisy, e.g., the cost incurred by the consumer’s
response to the coupon is not deterministic. For each individual consumer, the state transition is independent of
the action of the retailer. For given state Gt and action ut, define the distribution of observing a cost Ct = c to be
f(c|Gt, ut). In this case, the threshold policy computed using costs might not be optimal. Moreover, if the initial
belief is unknown to the retailer, it has to estimate the consumer state before making decision. Thus, we propose
some alternative approaches to decide which coupon to offer when those costs are random. A heuristic approach
to deal with the randomized cost is to use the threshold τ computed by the mean value of costs. Furthermore,
the estimation of consumer belief state pt or the actual state Gt is updated by the maximum a posteriori rule
(MAP) [15]. After the estimation process, the retailer decides which coupon to offer based on the threshold policy
given in Section III.
E. Summary of Main Results
For the problems described in Subsection II-A, II-B, and II-C, given all system parameters, we show the following:
• there exists an optimal stationary solution which has a single threshold property and
• the threshold only depends on the system parameters, i.e., transition probabilities and instantaneous cost
associated with each type of coupon.
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This means by adopting the optimal policy, the retailer will offer an HP coupon if pt is less than some threshold
and offer an LP if pt is above the threshold.
For the model described in Subsection II-C, we assume that the cost feedbacks are noisy and consumer belief
state is unknown to the retailer. For this model:
• we design a heuristic threshold policy when the received costs are noisy.
• a Bayesian estimation approach is proposed to estimate the actual state or the belief state of the consumer
when the initial state is unknown to the retailer.
III. OPTIMAL POLICIES WITH KNOWN CONSUMER STATISTICS
In this section, we consider the basic formulation as well as the first three extensions. First, we assume that there
are only one retailer and one consumer in the system and the state transition of the consumer is independent of the
coupon offered. The evolution of the minimum cost function is given in (9), (10), and (11).
A. Properties of Minimum Cost Function
Lemma 1: Assume V t,mβ to be the minimum cost when the decision horizon starts from t and only spans m
stages, given a time invariant action set ui ∈ U = {LP,HP}, for any i = 0, 1, . . . , V t,mβ (p) = βV t−1,mβ (p).
Proof: By (5) and ui ∈ {LP,HP} for any i = 0, 1, . . ..
V t,mβ (p) = minpi
Epi
[
t+m−1∑
i=t
βiC(pi, ui)|pt = p
]
= βmin
pi
Epi
[
t+m−2∑
i=t−1
βiC(pi, ui)|pt−1 = p
]
= βV t−1,mβ (p).
(14)
By using induction on t, we can easily prove V t,mβ (p) = βV
t−1,m
β (p) = · · · = βtV 0,mβ (p).
Lemma 2: The minimum cost function V tβ (p) is a concave and non-decreasing function of p.
Proof: We prove these properties by induction. Define V t,mβ to be the minimum cost when the decision horizon
starts from t and only spans k stages. For k = 1,
V t,kβ (p) = min{CL, (1− p)CHN + pCHA}, (15)
which is a concave function of p. For k = n−1, assume that V t,kβ (p) is a concave function. Then, for k = n, since
V t,n−1β (p) is concave and V
t,k
β,LP(p) = β
tCL+V
t+1,n−1
β (T (p)), by the definition of concavity and Lemma 1, we can
conclude that V t,kβ,LP(p) is concave. Also, V
t,k
β,HP(p) is an affine function of p, thus V
t,k
β (p) = min{V t,kβ,LP(p), V t,kβ,HP(p)}
is a concave function of p. Taking k →∞, V t,kβ (p)→ V tβ (p), which implies V tβ (p) is a concave function.
Next, we prove the non-decreasing property of the minimum cost function. For k = 1, as shown in equation
(15), it is a non-decreasing function of p. Assume that V t,kβ (p) is a non-decreasing function for k = n − 1. For
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k = n, Let p1 ≥ p2,
V t,kβ,LP(p1)− V t,kβ,LP(p2) (16)
= β(V t,n−1β (T (p1))− V n−1β (T (p2))) (17)
= β(V t,n−1β ((λA,A − λN,A)p1 + λN,A)
− V t,n−1β ((λA,A − λN,A)p2 + λN,A))) (18)
≥ 0. (19)
By using the same technique, we can prove that given p2 − p1 ≤ 0, CHN − CHA ≤ 0 and V t,k−1β (λN,A) −
V t,k−1β (λA,A) ≤ 0,
V t,kβ,HP(p1)− V t,kβ,HP(p2) ≥ 0. (20)
Since V t,kβ (pt) = min{V t,kβ,LP(p), V t,kβ,HP(p)}, it is the minimum of two non-decreasing functions. Therefore, V t,kβ (p)
is non-decreasing. By taking k →∞, V t,kβ (p)→ V tβ (p). Thus, V tβ (p) is a non-decreasing function.
Lemma 3: Let ΦHP to be the set of values of pt for which offering an HP coupon is the optimal action at time
t. Then, ΦHP is a convex set.
Proof: Since ΦHP = {p ∈ [0, 1], V tβ (p) = V tβ,HP(p)}, assume that pt = apt,1 + (1−a)pt,2 in which pt,1, pt,2 ∈
ΦHP and a ∈ [0, 1], V tβ (pt) can be written as:
V tβ (pt) = V
t
β (apt,1 + (1− a)pt,2) (21)
≥ aV tβ (pt,1) + (1− a)V tβ (pt,2) (22)
= aV tβ,HP(pt,1) + (1− a)V tβ,HP(pt,2) (23)
= a[(1− pt,1)[βtCHN + βV tβ (λN,A)] + pt,1[βtCHA + βV tβ (λA,A)]]
+ (1− a)[(1− pt,2)[βtCHN + βV tβ (λN,A)] + pt,2[βtCHA + βV tβ (λA,A)]] (24)
= V tβ,HP(apt,1 + (1− a)pt,2). (25)
Thus, we have shown that:
V tβ (pt) ≥ V tβ,HP(apt,1 + (1− a)pt,1) = V tβ,HP(pt). (26)
By the definition of V tβ (pt) in (11), V
t
β (pt) ≤ V tβ,HP(pt). Therefore, V tβ,HP(pt) = V tβ (pt), which implies ΦHP is
convex.
10
B. Optimal Stationary Policy Structure
Theorem 1: There exists a threshold τ ∈ [0, 1] such that the following policy is optimal:
pi∗(pt) =
LP if τ ≤ pt ≤ 1HP if 0 ≤ pt ≤ τ (27)
More precisely, assume δ , CHA − CHN + β(Vβ(λA,A)− Vβ(λN,A)),
τ =

CL−(1−β)(CHN+βVβ(λN,A))
(1−β)δ T (τ) ≥ τ
CL+βλN,A(CHA+βVβ(λA,A))
(1−(λA,A−λN,A)β)δ −
(1−β(1−λN,A))(CHN+βVβ(λN,A))
(1−(λA,A−λN,A)β)δ T (τ) < τ
(28)
where for λN,A ≥ τ ,
Vβ(λN,A) = Vβ(λA,A) = CL/(1− β) (29)
and for λN,A < τ ,
Vβ(λN,A) = (1− λN,A)[CHN + V 1β (λN,A)]
+ λN,A[CHA + V
1
β (λA,A)], (30)
Vβ(λA,A) = min
n≥0
{G(n)}, (31)
where
G(n) =
CL
1−βn
1−β + β
n[T¯n(λA,A)(CHN + C(λN,A)) + T
n(λA,A)CHA]
1− βn+1[T¯n(λA,A) λN,Aβ1−(1−λN,A)β + Tn(λA,A)]
(32)
Tn(λA,A) =
(λA,A − λN,A)n+1(1− λA,A) + λN,A
1− (λA,A − λN,A) (33)
T¯n(λA,A) = 1− Tn(λA,A) (34)
C(λN,A) = β
(1− λN,A)CHN + λN,ACHA
1− (1− λN,A)β . (35)
The proof of Theorem 1 is provided in the Appendix A . An immediate consequence of this result is an upper
bound on pt for offering an HP coupon.
We define κ to be the ratio between the gain from offering an HP coupon to a Normal consumer and the loss
from offering an HP coupon to a consumer whom the retailer thinks is Normal but is actually Alerted. Thus,
κ =
CL − CHN
CHA − CHN . (36)
For fixed costs, the threshold can be bounded by the following two Corollaries.
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Corollary 1: In the model where transition probabilities (λN,A, λA,A) are unknown to the retailer, if
pt ≤ κ, (37)
then it is optimal for the retailer to offer an HP coupon.
Corollary 2: Fix the costs and λA,A, let λ1 = CL−CHNCHA−CHN and λ2 be the solution of
λ2
1−(λA,A−λ2) =
β(CL−CHA)λ2+CL−CHN
(1−β)CHA−CHN+βCL .
When λN,A ≥ λ2, the threshold τ in the optimal stationary policy can be written as a closed form expression with
respect to λN,A: if λN,A > λ1,
τ = κ; (38)
if λ2 < λN,A < λ1,
τ =
β(CL − CHA)λN,A + CL − CHN
(1− β)CHA − CHN + βCL . (39)
Moreover, if λN,A < λ2, τ can be upperbounded by
τ¯ =
λ2
1− (λA,A − λ2) . (40)
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Figure 3: Discounted cost resulted by using different decision policies
A detailed proof of Corollary 1 and 2 are presented in the Appendix B and Appendix C, respectively. To illustrate
the performance of the proposed threshold policy, we compare the discounted cost resulted from the threshold policy
with the greedy policy which minimize the instantaneous cost at each decision epoch as well as a lazy policy which
a retailer only offers LP coupons. We plot the discounted cost averaged over 1000 independent MDPs w.r.t. time t
for different decision policies in Fig. 3. The illustration demonstrates that the proposed threshold policy performs
better than the greedy policy and the lazy policy.
Figure 4a shows the optimal threshold policy with respect to λN,A for three fixed choices of λA,A. It can be
seen that the threshold is increasing when λN,A is small, this is because for a small λN,A, the consumers is less
likely to transition from Normal to Alerted. Therefore, the retailer tends to offer an HP coupon to the consumer.
When λN,A gets larger, the consumer is more likely to transition from Normal to Alerted. Thus, the retailer tends
12
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Figure 4: Threshold τ vs. β for different values of λA,A and λN,A
to play conservatively by decreasing the threshold for offering an LP coupon. When λN,A is greater than κ, the
retailer will just use κ to be the threshold for offering an HP coupon. One can also observe that with increasing
λA,A, the threshold τ decreases. On the other hand, for fixed CHN and CHA, Figure 4b shows that the threshold
τ increases as the cost of offering an LP coupon increases, making it more desirable to take a risk and offer an
HP coupon.
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Figure 5: Threshold τ vs. β for different values of λA,A and λN,A
The relationship between the discount factor β and the threshold τ as functions of transition probabilities is
shown in Figure 5. It can be seen in Figure 5a that the threshold increases as β increases. This is because when
β is small, the retailer values the present rewards more than future rewards. Therefore, the retailer tends to play
conservatively so that it will not “creep out” the consumer in the present. Figure 5b shows that the threshold is
high when λA,A is large or λN,A is small. A high λA,A value indicates that a consumer is more likely to remain in
Alerted state. The retailer is willing to play aggressively since once the consumer is in alerted state, it can take a
very long time to transition back to Normal state. A low λN,A value implies that the consumer is not very privacy
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sensitive. Thus, the retailer tends to offer HP coupons to reduce cost. One can also observe in Figure 5b that the
threshold τ equals to κ after λN,A exceeds the ratio κ. This is consistent with results shown in Figure 4.
The effect of an LP coupon cost on the threshold for different discount factors is plotted in Figure 6. It can be
seen that a higher CL will increase the threshold because the retailer is more likely to offer an HP coupon when
the cost of offering an LP coupon is high.
C. Consumer with Multi-Level Alerted States
In this section, we study the case that the consumer has multiple Alerted states. Without loss of generality, we
define the transition matrix to be
Λ =

λN,N λN,A1 . . . λN,AK
λA1,N λA1,A1 . . . λA1,AK
...
...
. . .
...
λAK ,N λAK ,A1 . . . λAK ,AK
 (41)
and e¯i to be the ith row of Λ. The expected cost at time t, given belief p¯t and action ut, has the following
expression:
C(p¯t, ut) =
 CL if ut = LPp¯Tt C¯ if ut = HP . (42)
Assuming that the retailer has perfect information about the belief states, the cost function evolves as follows.
By using an LP coupon at time t,
V tβ,LP(p¯t) = β
tCL + V
t+1
β (p¯t+1) = β
tCL + V
t+1
β (T (p¯t)), (43)
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Figure 7: Example of the optimal policy region for three-state consumer. (Parameters: λN,N = 0.7, λN,A1 =
0.2, λN,A2 = 0.1;λA1,N = 0.2, λA1,A1 = 0.5, λA1,A2 = 0.3;λA2,N = 0.1, λA2,A1 = 0.2, λA2,A2 = 0.7;β = 0.9, CL =
7, CHN = 1, CHA1 = 10, CHA2 = 20).
where T (p¯t) = p¯Tt Λ is the Markov transition operator generalizing (2). By using an HP coupon at time t,
V tβ,HP(p¯t) = β
tp¯Tt C¯ + V
t+1
β (p¯t+1) = β
tp¯Tt C¯ + p¯
T
t

V t+1β (e¯1)
V t+1β (e¯2)
...
V t+1β (e¯K+1)
 . (44)
Therefore, by (11), we have V tβ (p¯t) = min{V tβ,LP(p¯t), V tβ,HP(p¯t)}.
In this problem, since the instantaneous costs are nondecreasing with the state when the action is fixed and the
evolution of belief state is the same for both LP and HP, the existence of an optimal stationary policy with threshold
property is guaranteed by Proposition 2 in [16]. The optimal stationary policy for a three-state consumer model is
illustrated in Figure 7. For fixed costs, the plot shows the partition of the belief space based on the optimal actions
and reveals that offering an HP coupon is optimal when pN,t, the belief of the consumer being in Normal state, is
high.
IV. CONSUMERS WITH COUPON DEPENDENT TRANSITIONS
Generally, consumers’ reaction to HP and LP coupons are different. To be more specific, a consumer is likely to
feel less comfortable when being offered a coupon on medication (HP) than food (LP). Thus, we assume that the
Markov transition probabilities are dependent on the coupon offered. Let pt denote the belief of a consumer being
in the Alerted state at time t.
As shown in Figure 2, by offering an LP coupon, the state transition follows the Markov chain
ΛLP =
1− λN,A λN,A
1− λA,A λA,A
 . (45)
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Figure 8: Optimal policy threshold for consumer with/without coupon dependent transition probabilities. (Parameters:
λN,A = 0.2, λA,A = 0.8, λ
′
N,A = 0.5, λ
′
A,A = 0.9, β = 0.9).
Otherwise, the state transition follows
ΛHP =
1− λ′N,A λ′N,A
1− λ′A,A λ′A,A
 . (46)
According to the model in Section II, λA,A > λN,A, λ′A,A > λ
′
N,A. Moreover, we assume that offering an HP
coupon will increase the probability of transition to or staying at Alerted state. Therefore, λ′A,A > λA,A and
λ′N,A > λN,A. The minimum cost function evolves as follows: for an HP coupon offered at time t, we have
V tβ,HP(pt) = β
tC(pt,HP) + (1− pt)V t+1β (λ′N,A) + ptV t+1β (λ′A,A).
Otherwise,
V tβ,LP(pt) = β
tCL + V
t+1
β (pt+1) = β
tCL + V
t+1
β (T (pt)),
where T (pt) = λN,A(1− pt) + λA,Apt is the one step transition defined in Section II.
Theorem 2: Given action dependent transition matrices ΛLP and ΛHP, the optimal stationary policy has threshold
structure.
A detailed proof of Theorem 2 is presented in the Appendix D.
Figure 8 shows the effect of costs on the threshold τ . We can see that for a fixed CL and CHA pair, the threshold
for LP coupons for consumers in this model is lower than our original model without coupon-dependent transition
probabilities. The retailer can only offer an LP coupon with certain combination of costs; we call this the LP-only
region. One can also see that the LP-only region for the coupon-independent transition case is smaller than that for
the coupon-dependent transition case since for the latter, the likelihood of being in an Alerted state is higher for
the same costs.
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V. POLICIES UNDER NOISY COST FEEDBACK AND UNCERTAIN INITIAL BELIEF
In this section, we study the case in which the received costs are random. In the previous sections, if the retailer
offered an HP coupon at time t, then it could learn the state of the consumer at time t based on whether there
received cost was CHN or CHA. If the cost feedback is random, the the retailer may not be able to infer the
consumer’s state exactly. We describe policy heuristics for this setting that perform Bayesian estimation of the
quantity pt used in the threshold policy earlier. This approach is also useful when the initial value p0 is not known
to the retailer.
We model the noisy cost feedback by assuming the received cost Ct is random. The distribution of Ct is
given by a conditional probability density f(c|Gt, ut) on a bounded subset of R, where Gt is the state of the
consumer and ut is the action taken by the retailer at time t. To match the previous model, we further take
f(c|Gt = Alerted, ut = LP) = f(c|Gt = Normal, ut = LP) to indicate that the received cost conveys no information
about the state under an LP coupon. Let f(c|ut = LP) = f(c|Gt = Alerted, ut = LP). For a given value pt = p,
define the likelihood of observing a cost Ct = c under the two coupons:
`(c|LP, p) = f(c|Alerted, LP) (47)
`(c|HP, p) = f(c|Normal,HP)(1− p) + f(c|Alerted,HP)p (48)
These likelihoods will be useful in defining the two estimators.
In both approaches in this section the retailer computes an estimate pˆt of the probability pt that Gt = Alerted.
It then uses (27) to decide which coupon to offer at time t by comparing pˆt to a version of the threshold in
(28). Define CL, CHN , and CHA to be the feasible cost sets {c : f(c|LP) > 0}, {c : f(c|Alerted,HP) > 0}, and
{c : f(c|Normal,HP) > 0}, respectively. Since τ involves the costs CL, CHN and CHA, there are several ways to
compute an approximate threshold under the cost uncertainty.
Firstly, we can set CL, CHN and CHA to be the expected costs:
CL =
∫
R
cf(c|LP)dc (49)
CHN =
∫
R
cf(c|Normal,HP)dc (50)
CHA =
∫
R
cf(c|Alerted,HP)dc. (51)
Plugging these into (28) gives the mean threshold τavg. Since τ is monotonically increasing in CL and CHA and
monotonically decreasing in CHN , we can compute and upper bound on τ by setting CL = max{c : c ∈ CL},
CHA = max{c : c ∈ CHA}, and CHN = max{c : c ∈ CHN }. These values give the upper bound threshold
τmax. Similarly, by setting CL and CHA to the lower bounds on the support and CHN to the upper bound,
we obtain a lower bound threshold τmin. Finally, we computed a robust version of threshold τR as τR = {τ :
max
CL,CHN ,CHA
{min
pi(pt)
V tβ (pt)}}, where (CL, CHN , CHA) ∈ CL × CHN × CHA, is the This threshold policy is the
largest (cost case) threshold over all possible combination of costs. Thus, it gives the max−min value of the total
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Figure 9: Temporal discounted costs for different heuristics on computing thresholds. (Parameters: λN,A = 0.2,
λA,A = 0.8, p0 = 0.2,β = 0.95, f(c|LP) = Unif[6, 10], f(c|Normal,HP) = Unif[0.2, 5.8], and f(c|Alerted,HP) =
Unif[12, 20]). The discounted cost is averaged over 1000 independent runs.
discounted cost. We can see that the total discounted cost induced by this robust version of threshold is close to
that induced by using the upper bound of costs.
A. MAP Estimation of the Consumer State
In the previous model, if ut = HP the retailer could infer Gt based on Ct, so pt+1 is given by the state transitions
of the Markov chain. With noisy costs this exact inference is no longer possible. A simple heuristic for the retailer
is to try to infer Gt based on the random cost Ct, compute an estimate of pt, and then use the previous strategy.
At time t = 1, given an initial p0 we estimate pˆ1 = T (p0). The retailer then applies the threshold policy (27)
with input pˆ1 to offer a coupon. For times t = 2, 3, . . . the retailer treats the estimate pˆt−1 as an estimate of the
probability that Gt−1 = Alerted. If ut−1 = LP, then the retailer sets pˆt = T (pˆt−1). If ut−1 = HP then the retailer
uses a maximum a posteriori probability (MAP) detection rule to estimate the state Gt−1 based on the received
cost Ct−1. That is, it sets Gˆt−1 = Normal if
f(Ct−1|Normal,HP)(1− pˆt−1)
f(Ct−1|Alerted,HP)pˆt−1 > 1 (52)
and Gˆt−1 = Alerted otherwise, where Ct−1 is the received cost at time t− 1. It then uses the following estimate
pt at time t:
pˆt =
λN,A if Gˆt = NormalλA,A if Gˆt = Alerted (53)
Essentially, the retailer uses MAP estimation to infer Gt−1 after receiving the cost Ct−1 from the action ut−1 =
HP. If the densities f(c|Normal,HP) and f(c|Alerted,HP) have disjoint supports, then the inference of Gt−1 is
error free, so Gˆt−1 = Gt−1 and the estimate pˆt is correct. Figure 9 shows the discounted cost as a function of time
for some different variants of the threshold in (28). In this example the cost distributions are uniformly distributed
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in disjoint intervals. The plot shows that the mean threshold yields a total discounted cost that is slightly less than
the upper and lower bound thresholds.
B. Bayesian Estimation of State Probabilities
In the previous approach, the retailer estimates the underlying state and then uses this to form an estimate of
the probability pt that Gt = Alerted. A different approach is to form a Bayes estimate of pt: the retailer computes
a probability distribution on [0, 1] representing its uncertainty about pt. To choose an action ut it can use a point
estimate of pt to use in (27) with one of the thresholds described before.
In this formulation, the estimator of pt is a probability distribution. Let qt−1(p) be the estimator of pt−1. The
retailer treats this as a prior distribution. Upon receiving the cost Ct−1 it computes a posterior estimate on pt−1
using Bayes rule. If ut−1 = HP, it sets
qt−1(p|Ct−1) = `(Ct−1|HP, p)qt−1(p)∫ 1
0
`(Ct−1|HP, p′)qt−1(p′)dp′
(54)
If ut−1 = LP then from (47) we can see that `(Ct−1|LP, p) does not depend on p, so the posterior qt−1(p|Ct−1) =
qt−1(p) in this case. Given the posterior estimate qt−1(p|Ct−1) the retailer then evolves the state distribution
through the Markov chain governing the state to form the prior distribution qt(p) for estimating pt at time t. That
is, if Pt−1 is a random variable with distribution qt−1(p|Ct−1), then qt(p) is the distribution of T (Pt−1). Let
Qt−1(p|Ct−1) =
∫ p
0
qt−1(p′|Ct−1) be the cumulative distribution function of Pt−1. Then
P (T (Pt−1) ≤ p) = P
(
Pt−1 ≤ p− λN,A
λA,A − λN,A
)
= Qt−1
(
p− λN,A
λA,A − λN,A
∣∣Ct−1) (55)
so
qt(p) =
1
λA,A − λN,A qt−1
(
p− λN,A
λA,A − λN,A
∣∣Ct−1) . (56)
The retailer then uses qt(p) to form a point estimate pˆt of pt suitable for applying the threshold policy in (27)
and (28). We consider two such point estimates which we call the mean and max estimators, respectively:
pˆt,mean =
∫ 1
0
pqt(p)dp (57)
pˆt,MAP = argmax
p∈[0,1]
qt(p). (58)
Figure 10 shows the discounted cost versus time for uniformly distributed costs with overlapping support. The
decision is made by following the optimal stationary policy computed by the mean threshold in V. We illustrate
the result for four algorithms: the solid curve and the dash-dot curve are the MAP and mean strategy described
above, respectively; the dashed curve is a policy in which the costs are random but the algorithm is given side
information about Gt after choosing ut = HP (perfect state information); finally, the curve with cross is the MAP
estimate of actual state Gt described in Section V-A. In this example, as one can expect, decision making with
perfect state information has the minimum discounted cost. MAP estimation of Gt results in an 0.82% increase in
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Figure 10: Temporal discounted costs for different estimation mechanisms. (Parameters: λN,A = 0.2,λA,A = 0.8,
p0 = 0.2,β = 0.9, f(c|LP) = Unif[3, 9], f(c|Normal,HP) = Unif[0.25, 7.75], f(c|Alerted,HP) = Unif[6, 18]). The
discounted cost is averaged over 1000 independent runs.
total discounted cost compared to the case in which the retailer receives perfect information about consumer state.
However, the MAP and mean policy to estimate belief state pt only have 2.9% and 4.29% increase, respectively.
Thus, the MAP for estimating belief perfoms slightly better than the Mean policy. Effectively, the lack of initial
belief knowledge does not affect the discouted cost very much on average. This is because offering an HP coupon
allows the retailer to learn the actual state from the cost feedback, thus, reset the belief state.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We proposed a POMDP model to capture the interactions between a retailer and a privacy-sensitive consumer
in the context of personalized shopping. The retailer seeks to minimize the expected discounted cost of violating
the consumer’s privacy. We showed that the optimal coupon-offering policy is a stationary policy that takes the
form of an explicit threshold that depends on the model parameters. In summary, the retailer offers an HP coupon
when the Normal to Alerted transition probability is low or the probability of staying in Alerted state is high.
Furthermore, the threshold optimal policy also holds for consumers whose privacy sensitivity can be captured via
multiple alerted states as well as for the case in which consumers exhibit coupon-dependent transition. For the
case in which the cost feedbacks from the consumer are noisy, we have introduced a heuristic method using the
mean value of costs to compute the decision threshold. Furhtermore, under noisy cost feedbacks scenario, we have
introduced a Bayesian data analysis approach for decision making which includes estimating consumer belief state
when the initial belief state is unknown to the retailer. Our work suggests several interesting future directions: one
straightfoward extension of our work is to model uncertainties in the statistical model for the consumer transition
probabilities. Further a field, one can also develop game theoretic models to study the interaction between a retailer
and strategic consumers and develop methods to test those models in practice.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Proof: Let pF be the stationary distribution of the Markov transition. Then pF = λA,ApF + (1 − pF )λN,A,
which implies pF =
λN,A
1−λA,A+λN,A . Remember that the threshold is the solution to V
t
β,LP(pt) = V
t
β,HP(pt). Let τ
be the threshold value, we have:
βtCL + V
t+1
β (T (τ))
= (1− τ)[βtCHN + V t+1β (λN,A)] + τ [βtCHA + V t+1β (λA,A)].
(59)
By the definition of V tβ (pt), we know that V
t
β (pt) = β
tVβ(pt). Thus V tβ (λN,A) = β
tVβ(λN,A) and V tβ (λA,A) =
βtVβ(λA,A).
If T (τ) ≥ τ , which is equivalent to pF ≥ τ , then V t+1β (T (τ)) = V t+1β,LP(T (τ)). Therefore, V tβ,LP(τ) =
lim
n→∞{β
t 1−βn
1−β CL+β
nV t+1β (T
n(τ))} where Tn(τ) = T (Tn−1(τ)) = pF (1−(λA,A−λN,A)n)+(λA,A−λN,A)nτ .
Taking n→∞, we have V tβ,LP(τ) = βt C1−β . Substitute this into (59) yields:
CL
1− β = (1− τ)CHN + τCHA + β(τVβ(λA,A) + (1− τ)Vβ(λN,A)). (60)
By rearranging terms in the above expression, we have
τ =
CL
1−β − CHN − βVβ(λN,A)
(CHA − CHN ) + β(Vβ(λA,A)− Vβ(λN,A)) . (61)
If pF ≤ τ , then T (τ) ≤ τ . Therefore V t+1β (T (τ)) = V t+1β,HP(T (τ)), which implies
V tβ,LP(τ) = β
tCL + V
t+1
β (T (τ)) = β
tCL + V
t+1
β,HP(T (τ)) = V
t
β,HP(τ). (62)
In this case,
CL + βVβ,HP(T (τ)) = Vβ,HP(τ). (63)
Substitute (1) and (9) into (63), we have
τ =
CL − (1− β(1− λN,A))(CHN + βVβ(λN,A))
(1− (λA,A − λN,A)β)(CHA − CHN + β(Vβ(λA,A)− V (λN,A)))
+
βλN,A(CHA + βVβ(λA,A))
(1− (λA,A − λN,A)β)(CHA − CHN + β(Vβ(λA,A)− V (λN,A))) .
(64)
Next, we present how to compute Vβ(λN,A) and Vβ(λA,A).
Case 1: If λN,A ≥ τ , then by Modeling Assumption 2, λA,A ≥ λN,A ≥ τ and pF ≥ λN,A ≥ τ . Thus, both λA,A
and λN,A are in ΦLP, therefore,
Vβ(λN,A) = Vβ(λA,A) =
CL
1− β . (65)
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Case 2: If λN,A ≤ τ , we have Vβ(λN,A) = Vβ,HP(λN,A). Therefore,
Vβ(λN,A) = (1− λN,A)[CHN + V 1β (λN,A)] + λN,A[CHA + V 1β (λA,A)]. (66)
Vβ(λA,A) = min
At∈{HP,LP}
Vβ,At(λA,A) (67)
= min{CL + V 1β (T (λA,A)), VHP(λA,A)} (68)
= min{CL 1− β
N
1− β , min0≤n≤N−1{CL
1− βn
1− β + V
n
β,HP(T
n(λA,A))}}. (69)
Since N →∞ and 0 ≤ β ≤ 1,
Vβ(λA,A) = min
n>0
{CL 1− β
n
1− β + β
nVβ,HP(T
n(λA,A))}. (70)
we have:
Vβ(λA,A) = min
n≥0
{
CL
1−βn
1−β + β
n[T¯n(λA,A)(CHN + C(λN,A)) + T
n(λA,A)CHA]
1− βn+1[T¯n(λA,A) λN,Aβ1−(1−λN,A)β + Tn(λA,A)]
}. (71)
where
Tn(λA,A) = T (T
n−1(λA,A)) =
(λA,A − λN,A)n+1(1− λA,A) + λN,A
1− (λA,A − λN,A) , (72)
T¯n(λA,A) = 1− Tn(λA,A) (73)
C(λN,A) = β
(1− λN,A)CHN + λN,ACHA
1− (1− λN,A)β . (74)
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF COROLLARY 1
Proof: By setting VLP(pt) ≥ VHP(pt), we have
βtCL + βV
t
β (T (pt)) ≥
(1− pt)[βtCHN + βV tβ (λN,A)] + pt[βtCHA + βV tβ (λA,A)].
(75)
By Lemma 2 in the appendix, V tβ (pt) is a concave function. Thus,
V tβ (T (pt)) = V
t
β (λN,A(1− pt) + λA,Apt)
≥ (1− pt)V tβ (λN,A) + ptV tβ (λA,A).
(76)
By substituting 76 into 75, we can simplify inequality 75 to (1 − pt)CHN + ptCHA ≤ CL, which implies pt ≤
CL−CHN
CHA−CHN = κ when V
t
LP(pt) ≥ V tHP(pt).
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APPENDIX C
PROOF OF COROLLARY 2
Proof: Assume that λN,A ≥ τ , we have λA,A > pF = λN,A1−(λA,A−λN,A) > λN,A ≥ τ . In this case, By (61) and
(65), we have
τ =
CL − CHN
CHA − CHN = κ. (77)
Thus, τ = κ if λN,A > κ. Assume that λN,A < τ , then there are two cases for pF :
Case 1: pF > τ , then λA,A > pF > τ , which implies
Vβ(λA,A) = Vβ,LP(λA,A) =
CL
1− β . (78)
By (61), (66), and (78), we have
τ =
β(CL − CHA)λN,A + CL − CHN
(1− β)CHA − CHN + βCL . (79)
Therefore, τ = β(CL−CHA)λN,A+CL−CHN(1−β)CHA−CHN+βCL if pF =
λN,A
1−(λA,A−λN,A) ≥ τ =
β(CL−CHA)λN,A+CL−CHN
(1−β)CHA−CHN+βCL and λN,A <
β(CL−CHA)λN,A+CL−CHN
(1−β)CHA−CHN+βCL .
Case 2: pF < τ , τ can be computed by (64), (66), and (71). Moreover, for fixed λA,A, (64) is a non-decreasing
function w.r.t. λN,A. Thus, let τ+ =
λN,A
1−(λA,A−λN,A) =
β(CL−CHA)λN,A+CL−CHN
(1−β)CHA−CHN+βCL , τ ≤ τ+ in Case 2. Therefore,
τ+ is an upperbound for the optimal action in Case 2.
Since (64) is non-decreasing, (79) is decreasing and intersects with (77) at λN,A = CL−CHNCHA−CHN , we have proved
Corollary 2.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Proof: Let pF =
λN,A
1−(λA,A−λN,A) and p
′
F =
λ′N,A
1−(λ′A,A−λ′N,A) be the stationary belief of a consumer being in
alerted state when the transition matrix is ΛLP and ΛHP. Since τ be the threshold of offering either HP or LP
coupons. Then we have V tβ,LP(τ) = V
t
β,HP(τ). This implies:
V tβ,LP(τ)− V tβ,HP(τ)
= βt(CL − (1− τ)CHN − τCHA) + [V t+1β (T (τ))− V t+1β (T ′(τ))].
(80)
In order to compute the threshold τ , we need to divide the computation into four cases with respect to to T (τ) and
T ′(τ).
Case 1: T (τ) > τ and T ′(τ) > τ . Thus
V t+1β (T (τ)) = V
t+1
β,LP(T (τ)) = β
t+1(
CL
1− β ). (81)
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V t+1β (T
′(τ)) = V t+1β,LP(T
′(τ)) = βt+1(
CL
1− β ). (82)
By setting V tβ,LP(τ)− V tβ,HP(τ) = 0, we have τ = CL−CHNCHA−CHN .
Case 2: T (τ) < τ and T ′(τ) > τ .
Since T (τ) < τ , HP coupons will be offered from timeslot t + 1. Define η = β(λA,A−λN,A)1−β(λA,A−λN,A) and η
′ =
β(λ′A,A−λ′N,A)
1−β(λ′A,A−λ′N,A) . Thus,
V t+1β (T (τ)) = V
t+1
β,HP(T (τ)) (83)
= βt
∞∑
i=1
{βi[(CHA − CHN )(pF (1− (λA,A − λN,A)i) + (λA,A − λN,A)iτ) + (CHN )]} (84)
= βt{
∞∑
i=1
βi[(CHA − CHN )(pF + CHN )] +
∞∑
i=1
βi[(CHA − CHN )(τ − pF )(λ1 − λN,A)i]} (85)
= βt{ β
1− β [(CHA − CHN )(pF ) + (CHN )]η(CHA − CHN )(τ − pF )} (86)
= βt{pF (CHA − CHN )( β
1− β − η)
β
1− β (CHN ) + η(CHA − CHN )τ}. (87)
Because T ′(τ) > τ , only LP coupons will be offered after time t.
V t+1β (T
′(τ)) = V t+1β,LP(T
′(τ)) = βt
βCL
1− β . (88)
By setting V tβ,LP(τ)− V tβ,HP(τ) = 0, we have then that τ is equal to
τ =
(CL − CHN ) + pF (CHA − CHN )[ β1−β − η] + β1−β (CHN − CL)
(CHA − CHN )[1− η] . (89)
Case 3: T (τ) < τ and T ′(τ) < τ . In this case,
V t+1β (T (τ)) = V
t+1
β,HP(T (τ)). (90)
V t+1β (T
′(τ)) = V t+1β,HP(T
′(τ)). (91)
Setting V tβ,LP(τ)− V tβ,HP(τ) = 0, we can find the threshold τ by equation
τ =
CL − CHN + (CHA − CHN )[ β1−β (pF − p′F )− (pF η − p′F η′)]
(CHA − CHN )[η′ − η + 1] . (92)
Case 4: T (τ) > τ and T ′(τ) < τ . In this case,
V t+1β (T (τ)) = V
t+1
β,LP(T (τ)). (93)
V t+1β (T
′(τ)) = V t+1β,HP(T
′(τ)). (94)
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By setting V tβ,LP(τ)− V tβ,HP(τ) = 0, we have τ equals to equation
τ =
(CL − CHN )(1 + β1−β )− p′F (CHA − CHN )[η′ − β1−β ]
(CHA − CHN )[1 + η′] . (95)
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